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	 War, peace and suicide: the case of Northern Ireland 
 
abstract: Durkheim’s idea that war reduces suicide through greater social and political 
integration has been used to explain suicide trends during the Northern Ireland conflict 
and in the period of peace. The applicability of Durkheim is critically evaluated through 
a case study of suicide trends by age, gender and cause of death over a forty-year 
period. The key finding is that the cohort of children and young people who grew up in 
the worst years of violence during the 1970s, have the highest and most rapidly 
increasing suicide rates, and account for the steep upward trend in suicide following 
the 1998 Agreement.  Contrary to Durkheim, the recent rise in suicide involves a 
complex of social and psychological factors. These include the growth in social 
isolation, poor mental health arising from the experience of conflict, and the greater 
political stability of the past decade. The transition to peace means that externalised 
aggression is no longer socially approved. It becomes internalised instead.  
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Introduction 
In June 1998, the British Medical Journal published a news item with the headline, 
‘Male suicide rate rises as Irish Troubles ease’ (Payne, 1998: 1850).  This was a few 
months after the 1998 Agreement between the Irish and British Governments and all 
the Northern Ireland political parties.1 Violent conflict in Northern Ireland had cost 3,500 
lives over a thirty-year period in a region containing barely 1.5 million people. 
According to one medical source, the conflict had ‘protected society’ because people 
had involved themselves in community and public life. With the coming of peace the 
suicide rate has almost doubled. 
 
	In this brief item, the echoes of Durkheim (2002) are evident, but not surprising, as his 
work has had an enduring influence on the understanding of suicide for more than a 
century (Van Poppel and Day, 1996: 500). In essence, Durkheim argued that wars 
‘rouse collective sentiments, stimulate partisan spirit and patriotism, political and 
national faith, alike, and (…) cause a stronger integration of society’ (2002: 166). Once 
violence ceases, there is a ‘vacuum’ and suicide increases as the protective effects of 
war subside. The notion that a peace process might also generate a greater sense of 
political integration, especially in societies riven with violent conflict over many years, is 
apparently not relevant to the observations available to Durkheim at the time. Peace 
simply meant a return to ‘normal’ pre-war levels of ‘egoistic’ and ‘anomic’ suicides, the 
two main types of suicide characteristic in ‘our great modern States’ (Durkheim, 2002: 
341).2 
 
The status of the Northern Ireland conflict is much debated – the contending 
representations include civil war, national liberation struggle, religious/sectarian 
conflict, and a problem of terrorism. While this opens up interesting questions about the 
types of individual and collective political motivation involved, the form of conflict is less 
important than the similarity of forces generated by in-country political upheaval and 
war: ‘Great national wars have the same effect as political disturbances’ – suicides 
decline (Durkheim, 2002: 205). In all types of conflict, social integration is increased 
because group members come together to defend collective interests against the 
threat of outsiders (O’Malley, 1975: 348).  
 
Durkheim was essentially concerned to demonstrate how social factors determine 
individual consciousness and behaviour.  It was crucial to the project of scientific 
sociology to analyse the phenomenon of suicide – conventionally understood as 
‘internal, pathological and medical’ (Marsh, 2010: 100-114) – and to demonstrate that 
suicide rates vary between countries and social groups because of differences in social 
	forces (Bailey, 1998: 16-18).  
  
Durkheim viewed war as part of political life which, along with religion and family life, 
comprised the three domains explored in his treatment of social integration and 
regulation. All three were crucial to the propensities to ‘internalised violence’ (suicide) 
and ‘externalised violence’ (homicide/femicide). Suicide was more prevalent in modern 
individualistic and less regulated societies where the influences of religion and family 
and political life were weaker, and ‘egoistic’ behaviour more common. Homicide, on the 
other hand, depends on opposite conditions. Where ‘family spirit has retained its 
ancient strength’ the practice of vendetta survives, and ‘where religious faith is very 
intense, it often inspires murders and this is also true of political faith’ (Durkheim, 2002: 
323) He concluded that high rates of homicide confer ‘a sort of immunity against 
suicide’ (Durkheim, 2002: 317). While recognising that suicide and homicide 
sometimes ‘react under the same conditions in the same way’ he nevertheless felt that 
‘the antagonistic cases are the most numerous’ (Durkheim, 2002: 322; see also Whitt, 
1994).3  
 
Beyond Social Integration 
One criticism of Durkheim’s sociology is its insistence that individual psychology plays 
no part in explaining the nature and prevalence of suicide. For example, Lane argues 
that it is essential to consider the psychology of frustration and aggression in 
understanding whether violence is directed at others or internalised. His study of 
Philadelphia shows that between 1870 and the end of the century, after decades of 
ethnic and economic turbulence, the suicide rate more than doubled and there was a 
pronounced drop in homicides. After 1870, Philadelphia not only became a more 
ordered and regulated city, but also its people were increasingly (and variously) 
socialised into the behavioural disciplines required of the new industrial work force 
	(Lane, 1979: 120-3). In these new conditions individuals were more likely to internalise 
frustration and aggression, hence the increase in suicide. Whereas Durkheim saw 
higher suicide rates caused by the less regulated, ‘anomic’ nature of modern industrial 
society, Lane argues the reverse by proposing that this ‘fatalistic suicide’ was the 
product of an integrated, constraining environment. This type of suicide merits only a 
footnote in Durkheim’s study (2002: 239).  
 
A second challenge to Durkheim is that integration theory fails to link social forces and 
individual experience. The concept that brings the two together is ‘social isolation’ 
which is both the result of social factors and, through loneliness and depression, 
prevents individuals from accessing social support (Bailey, 1998: 257). Social isolation, 
linked to social factors and the life cycle, is the central concept in Sainsbury’s study of 
suicide in 1950s London in which he writes of ‘the social and cultural isolation of the 
immigrant; the solitude of old age (…); the unemployed’s sense of social rejection’ 
(Sainsbury, 1971: 254). The concept has been operationalised in three measures – the 
proportion of the population that has recently migrated, lives alone and is not in work 
(Dorling and Gunnell, 2003). Patterns of social isolation have changed historically as 
the experience of the life cycle itself changes. This can be seen in the shifting profile of 
suicides towards younger age groups observable in many countries, a trend which 
expresses a profound change in the relative insecurities of younger and older people 
(Baudelot and Establet, 2008 :194). 
 
The most forceful attack on Durkheim comes from those who reject official statistics as 
representing the social facts of suicide. Most empirically-based studies of war and 
suicide do not question the validity of official records or discuss the impacts that war 
may have on the process of gathering and classifying suicide statistics. Durkheim was 
aware of this point but saw it as a relatively insignificant one. His language is 
	interesting. The ‘paralysis in administration’ as a possible cause of a fall in suicides at 
the start of war is described as an ‘accidental cause’ and a ‘mistake in accounting’ 
(Durkheim 2002: 164-5). It is also clear from his analysis of monthly suicide statistics 
that he regarded official figures as a sensitive barometer of political crises and events 
(2002: 162-3).  
 
Against this, Douglas argued that official suicide statistics, far from showing real rates 
and trends, should be seen as the product of a social process of negotiation, 
interpretation and definition. Because suicide is socially stigmatised, families will seek 
to avoid suicide as a categorisation but they will have varying degrees of success, 
according to social position. Douglas proposed that ‘the greater degree of social 
“integration” of a group, the lower will be its official suicide rate as a result of the official 
categorization process itself’ (his emphasis) (Douglas, 1971: 129). Public officials 
involved in the judgement of suicidal intent are heavily influenced by commonsense 
assumptions and shared social meanings (Bailey, 1998: 23). Further, ‘medical 
authorities protect their authority by determining suicide conservatively’ (Timmermans, 
2005: 311). 
 
The social process of suicide classification reflects assumptions about gender (Canetto 
and Sakinofsky, 1998). Divergent gendered expectations about suicidal behaviour may 
affect both the choices of the suicidal as well as the interpretations of doctors, coroners 
and others. Most studies tend to exclude the bulk of suicidal behaviour because of the 
focus on completed suicides. This especially affects women and leads to spurious 
conclusions about women’s social integration and contentment with their social roles 
(Kushner and Sterk, 2005: 1141). For instance, recently collected data on self-harming 
presentations at hospitals in Northern Ireland give a higher rate for women than for 
men (Northern Ireland Registry of Deliberate Self-Harm, 2010).  
	 
Douglas’s approach has been applied in the Northern Ireland context. Prior (1985: 186) 
observed coders of death certificates in Belfast in the early 1980s and suggests there 
are ‘fundamental flaws’ in the process of death registration. More recently, O’Connor 
and Sheehy’s work on gender and suicide (1997: 240) refers to ‘quite a large 
discrepancy between the official classification (…) and the picture presented by inquest 
papers’. As with Douglas, the implication is that the official figures provide unreliable 
data on the dead.   
 
It is tempting to dismiss suicide statistics as of little value to a sociological analysis. 
There are two major arguments against this position. The first is that despite the 
inconsistencies of doctors, coroners and coders, and the influence of families and 
others, there remains sufficient accuracy for analytical purposes (Sainsbury and 
Jenkins, 1982: 44). Secondly, the process of critically analysing suicide data, especially 
in periods of armed conflict, may reveal significant observations about the social 
context of suicide. Suicide statistics, whatever their limitations, are an important tool of 
analysis as long as their social construction is acknowledged and incorporated into the 
analysis. 
 
War, Peace and Suicide 
Much of the recent work on war and suicide retains an emphasis on Durkheim’s 
concept of social integration, paying little attention to individual motivation and 
variations in the meaning that specific social conditions may have for different groups 
of people. But the concept has been modified to accommodate the changing character 
of armed conflicts since Durkheim’s day and the relative impacts on civilians and 
combatants. There has also been increasing interest in the psychological 
consequences of war for frontline combatants and civilians (Abi-Rached, 2009).  
	  
Van Tubergen and Ultee (2006) reviewed the ‘war and suicide’ literature, focusing 
largely on the First and Second World Wars. They point out that a drop in suicides is 
observable in the non-belligerent countries, that suicides fluctuate considerably during 
the two wars (especially at the start and end) and that a fall in suicides may be the 
result of changes in economic activity rather than political integration (2006: 223). This 
is Marshall’s (1981) explanation for why suicide rates in the United States went down 
during the Second World War but not during the Korean and Vietnam wars. Van 
Tubergen and Ultee conclude that ‘a war might cause certain groups to fear being 
excluded from society, and this fear could result in higher suicide rates among these 
groups’ (2006: 226).  
 
Another strand of ‘war and suicide’ research focuses on the psychological impacts of 
actual and anticipated violence, including the behaviour of combat troops. The 
conditions of war vastly increase the means available for suicide as well as the 
frequency of desperate and inescapable situations. Henderson et al. (2006) found that 
the male suicide rate in Scotland rose between 1940 and 1943, especially in the under 
45 year old age group. This was against the long-term trend and the means of suicide 
proved to be critical: ‘firearms and explosives’ was the only method that increased 
significantly during the War. Female suicide trends were unaffected by the War.  
 
In Nazi Germany the number of suicides varied greatly as the War progressed. In the 
1920s and 1930s, there was an obsession with rising suicides rates and the issue 
became ‘a propagandist lever across political divides, and a routine signifier of Weimar 
misery’ (Goeschel, 2009: 29) – Hitler explicitly linked suicides to the hardships caused 
by the Versailles Peace Treaty. Then at the start of the Second War suicides fell but as 
German military successes were halted and reversed, suicides, including those of 
German Jews facing deportation, rose once more.4 In the spring of 1945, suicides 
	reached epidemic proportions both from fear of the advancing Red Army and as a 
consequence of its arrival. At least two million German women are believed to have 
been raped at this time, many of them repeatedly. In Berlin around 100,000 women 
were raped and 10,000 of them died, mostly from suicide (Beevor, 2003: 410).  
 
The availability of firearms during and after the war years was an important factor in 
explaining the elevated suicide rates in Serbia and Montenegro, but unlike Scotland, 
these were associated with older rather than younger age groups (Selakovic-Bursic et 
al., 2006). The male/female suicide differential was low (2:1) and actually narrowed 
slightly during the first war period (1991-94). 
 
Studies of suicides among combat troops are uncommon5 although it is evident that 
low morale and poor mental health are key concerns of military leaders. There is great 
political sensitivity over military suicides because such ‘weaknesses’ may be exploited 
by military and ideological opponents. The psychological impact of war is a highly 
contested area with some writers arguing against the screening of recruits and ‘over-
precautionary’ protections from the stresses of combat (Wessely, 2005). Studies of 
combatants in Iraq and Afghanistan show contradictory results. A team studying 
members of the UK’s Air Assault Brigade claim that mental health improved as a result 
of combat (Hughes et al., 2005), contrary to findings on U.S. combat troops (Hoge et 
al., 2004). Kang and Bullman (2008) found that the overall risk of suicide among U.S. 
veterans was not significantly different from the general population. This is contradicted 
by Bruce’s finding that military service, by increasing injury and long-term disability, 
increases the risk of depression, joblessness, and social isolation—‘all of which 
together increase suicide risk’ (Bruce, 2010: 102). She specifically argues that it is not 
entering or being in the military that increase suicide risk but the long-term 
‘downstream sequelae’ of military experience.  
 
	Braswell and Kushner take issue with this by suggesting that social integration within 
masculine military culture is itself ‘a key factor in the currently high rates of (U.S.) 
military suicides’ (2010: 5). All of the stress factors of recent deployments (Iraq and 
Afghanistan), including combat trauma, more frequent deployments and personal 
relationship difficulties, may be connected to the military’s ‘fatalistic masculinity’ and 
the ‘excessive regulation’ associated with it (Kushner and Sterk, 2005).  
 
While there is some disagreement over the U.S. military suicide statistics, the more 
significant issue is the different explanations being advanced for the recent suicide 
‘epidemic’. Is it oppressive military culture or the disabling psychological consequences 
of war? This is not simply a debate between sociological and psychological 
approaches as each suggests different types of intervention: reform of the ‘warrior 
ethos’ in the former and stronger psychiatric support in the latter. In the case of 
militarised conflicts, however, given the complexities of social and individual 
consequences, there is clearly a case to explore the strengths of both perspectives in 
accounting for suicides and in seeking to prevent them.  
 
Suicide and the Northern Ireland Conflict 
There are several studies that deal with suicide and the Northern Ireland conflict, and 
generally these accept the official statistics as providing the social facts on suicides. 
Lester (2002) correlated suicide rates with the numbers killed each year as a result of 
the conflict. Broadly speaking, suicide rates were higher when conflict deaths were 
lower but there is also a period in the early years when conflict deaths rose sharply 
while suicide rates went down.  
 
Similarly, Mcgowan et al. (2005) correlated coroners’ suicide verdicts with ‘terrorist-
related deaths’. Official figures were used for suicides but not for the conflict killings 
	which were drawn instead from a book compiled by four journalists (McKittrick et al., 
1999). A statistically significant inverse relationship was found for both men and 
women, and, in traditional Durkheimian fashion, the authors propose that ‘the Troubles 
affected a social cohesion and ghettoization’ that had the effect of protecting people 
from suicide (McGowan et al., 2005: 404). In contrast, O’Connor and Sheehy (1997) 
argue that the demographic, and specifically gender, profile of suicides in Northern 
Ireland is similar to that in Great Britain and Ireland, suggesting there is no conflict-
related effect. 
 
Suicide Trends and the Reliability of Data 
Figure 1 shows suicide rates per 100,000 of the Northern Ireland population for the 
period 1967 to 2008, based on three-year rolling averages.6 Between 1965 and 2008, 
the number of suicides registered in Northern Ireland was 6,131 of which 1,751 were 
female suicides (a male to female ratio of 3.5:1). Over the period of the conflict, there 
were about a thousand more suicides than conflict-related killings. 
 
  
Figure 1  Northern Ireland Suicide Rates by Gender, 1967-2008 
Source: Compiled from Registrar General Northern Ireland Annual Reports 
 
The reliability of the official suicide statistics in Northern Ireland is shaped by two main 
factors. The first is the time it takes for a death to be recorded as a suicide. The 
	majority of suicides registered in a given year do not occur in that year and there is no 
significant correlation between occurrence and registration data, suggesting that delays 
in registration are not consistent. Thus any attempt to relate suicides to 
contemporaneous events and short-term trends using the registered suicide data is 
fraught with difficulty. 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Coroner’s Office activity in the 1970s (number of cases) 
Source: Compiled from Registrar General Northern Ireland Annual Reports 
 
 
In the early years of the conflict the problem was especially acute because of the rapid 
increase in deaths from ‘external causes’. 7 The number of inquests doubled between 
1968 and 1973 (Figure 2). Inevitably, the registration of violent deaths was affected as 
coroners became flooded with work. Figure 3 indicates a time lag of three years or 
more between occurrences and registrations for conflict-related killings. Inquests for 
suicides, caught up in the backlog of cases, would have delayed suicide registrations in 
the same way. Therefore, the 1970s registered suicide data are particularly unreliable 
for judging suicide occurrences and suicide trends.  
 
	 
 
Figure 3  Conflict-related deaths, occurred and registered (numbers)a 
a The conflict-related deaths are ‘homicides’ added to deaths from ‘injury resulting from operations of war’ 
(International Classification of Diseases conventions). 
Source: Compiled from Registrar General Northern Ireland Annual Reports and Sutton (1994) 
 
 
The second major issue of reliability is the problem of determining the cause of death. 
A death from poisoning, for example, could be classified as a ‘suicide’ or an ‘accident’. 
From 1968 a third possibility, ‘events of undetermined intent’, was introduced to 
accommodate cases likely to be suicides but where doubts remained. 
 
The proportion of suicides that are ‘undetermined’ was particularly high between 1972 
and 1983, reaching 36 per cent in 1980. This could be explained by changes in the 
cause of death over time as some causes are more likely to attract the ‘undetermined 
intent’ classification (e.g. ‘drowning’ and ‘firearms and explosives’). For drowning, there 
is also a significant gender difference in the undetermined proportion, indicating that 
coroners are almost twice as likely to avoid a definite determination of suicide by 
drowning for men as they are for women. For all causes of death other than poisoning, 
however, there are now lower proportions of undetermined suicides in the registered 
data. The most likely explanation for the high undetermined rate in the early period of 
conflict is that coroners used the category more readily, and perhaps more casually, 
	due to pressure of business. 
 
There is another reason to believe that the registration of suicides was particularly 
unreliable in the early 1970s. Curiously, the number of registered accidental poisonings 
increased by three times between 1969 and 1972, while suicides by poisoning reduced 
by more than half. The suspicion must be that some suicides from poisoning were 
misclassified as accidents. There is a strong inverse relationship between ‘determined 
suicides’ and ‘accidents’ plus ‘undetermined suicides’ (Table 1).8  
 
Table 1  Pearson correlation coefficients for poisonings registered as accidents and suicides 
R values 1964-1984 
(n=21) 
1964-1979 
(n=16) 
1968-1984 
(n=17) 
a) Accidents + Undetermined Suicides  
b) Determined Suicides -0.650** -0.670** -0.571* 
a) Accidents  
b) Determined + Undetermined Suicides 
 
-0.554** -0.599* -0.541* 
*Significant at .05 level (2-tailed); **significant at .01 level (2-tailed) 
Source: Calculated from Registrar General Northern Ireland Annual Reports 
 
From the late 1970s, the registration of suicides is less disrupted and becomes more 
reliable. The published suicide statistics have further limitations, however. The 
published data record suicides and deaths of undetermined intent by age and gender. 
The cause of death, using International Classification of Diseases  (ICD) categories, is 
also provided. But no information is given on religion, social class or occupation, and 
individual records would need to be examined to derive such variables.  
 
Suicide Trends Analysis 
Figure 4 identifies three distinct periods for the all-persons suicide rate from 1978 
onwards. For the first period, there is a steady increase (y= 0.33) with a closely fitting 
trend line (R2= 0.94) up to a rate of 10.1 (1988), followed by a modest downturn (y= –
0.14) for a further ten years to a rate of 8.6. The steep upward trend in the post-
Agreement period appears to be interrupted by the values for 2003-2005, though the 
R2 value over ten years is still relatively high at 0.69. Again, administrative factors are 
partly responsible as the occurrence data show 2003 as the only year that is 
	significantly off trend. The reorganisation of the Coroners Service was in progress at 
this time.  
 
   
 
Figure 4  Trends in Suicide Rates (all persons, three year rolling averages) 
Source: Compiled from Registrar General Northern Ireland Annual Reports 
 
 
Taking Figure 4 as a model, trend values were calculated for a range of age groups for 
men and women for each of the periods (Table 2). The strongest trends upwards are 
for men aged 45-54 (y= 2.14) and 35-44 (y= 1.89) in period three. These groups were 
aged 15-24 and 5-14 in the 1970s.  
 
Table 2 also illustrates that suicide rates for older groups have declined over time while 
those for younger to middle aged groups have increased. The highest top rate in period 
three is for men aged 35-44 (38.9) followed closely by the 25-34 and 45-54 age groups 
(37.1 and 35.5 respectively). The pattern for women follows this exactly, except that 
the age band is one group higher in every case. 
 
 
 
 
 
	Table 2  Slope and linear regression values by gender and age bands 
  
 Period 1 (1978-1988) Period 2 (1988-1998) Period 3 (1998-2008) 
Age Group Slope 
(y) 
R2 Rate Range 
(Average)  
Slope 
(y) 
R2 Rate Range 
(Average)  
Slope 
(y) 
R2 Rate Range 
(Average)  
All Persons  0.33 0.94 6.56-10.1 (8.6 ) -0.14 0.68 
8.57-10.1 
(9.2 ) 0.58 0.69 
8.6-15.45 
(10.7) 
All Men  0.61 0.92 7.82-14.77 (11.6) -0.11 0.38 
13.41-15.57 
(14.1) 0.85 0.67 
13.62-23.98 
(17.0) 
All Women  0.08 0.27 4.96-6.49 (5.7) -0.17 0.75 
3.58-5.65 
(4.4) 0.32 0.74 
3.65-7.25 
(4.7) 
Men 15-24  0.52 0.38 9.96-19.55 0.44 0.28 14.76-24.25 0.12 0.01 15.64-28.13 
Women 15-24  0.17 0.39 2.31-5.48 -0.21 0.43 2.16-5.48 0.14 0.09 2.51-7.13 
Men 25-34 1.00 0.80 9.42-20.96 0.30 0.33 20.96-25.73 0.55 0.20 25.73-37.05 
Women 25-34 -0.29 0.50 4.02-8.43 -0.13 0.57 2.85-4.79 0.47 0.67 3.89-9.29 
Men 35-44 0.82 0.75 12.16-22.19 -0.11 0.10 16.24-19.87 1.89 0.80 16.41-38.93 
Women 35-44 0.34 0.60 5.96-10.1 -0.12 0.43 6.47-8.64 0.27 0.19 5.2-12.17 
Men 45-54 1.33 0.85 10.2-24.96 -0.43 0.37 13.08-20.58 2.14 0.90 14.39-35.47 
Women 45-54 -0.38 0.77 9.62-13.8 -0.34 0.48 7.22-12.24 0.57 0.74 5.79-12.91 
Men 55-64 0.34 0.18 14.46-23.7 -1.73 0.73 11.85-32.89 1.28 0.56 8.1-23.82 
Women 55-64 0.26 0.03 7.92-20.25 -0.37 0.73 3.45-8.25 0.72 0.67 2.43-10.32 
Men 65-74 0.11 0.02 12.40-21.54 -0.47 0.47 11.13-18.19 0.02 0.00 8.71-14.18 
Women 65-74 0.32 0.27 6.1-12.76 -0.43 0.46 3.9-11.19 0.19 0.27 2.91-6.20 
Men 75 and over 1.69 0.89 2.99-20.61 -0.67 0.45 7.99-20.36 0.51 0.60 6.70-14.36 
Women 75 and 
over 
0.09 0.07 1.43-4.94 -0.20 0.30 0.54-4.94 0.17 0.34 0.53-2.91 
Source: Compiled from Registrar General Northern Ireland Annual Reports 
Notes: i) Age band rates standardised by population in relevant age band; ii) Figures in bold are 
against the overall trend. 
 
 
To explore possible cohort affects Table 3 shows average suicide rates for six age 
bands over four periods.9 Cohort 3 has an increased rate in every decade for men and 
women. The pattern for Cohorts 4-6 is an increase between the first and second 
decades but a decline for every decade thereafter (with the exception of Cohort 4 for 
women). Again, this pattern applies to men and women in a remarkably consistent 
fashion.10    
 
The equivalent of Cohort 3 is the group aged 25-34 shown in period one of Table 2 and 
the 35-44 age group in period two.  This cohort has a well above average increasing 
suicide rate (y= 1.00) in period one, an average decline (y= –0.11) in period two and a 
	sharply increasing trend in period three (y= 2.14). Cohort 2, aged 15-24 in period one, 
had a rising suicide rate (y= 0.30) in period two, against the downward trend, and a 
rapidly increasing rate (y= 1.89) in period three.  
 
Table 3  Average suicide rates for age cohorts by decade 
 
 
 
For women, Cohort 3 has a declining rate (y= –0.29) against the trend in period one but 
shows an above average rise in period three. Cohort 4 (aged 35-44 in period one) has 
an above average rising suicide rate (y= 0.34) in period one, a relatively strongly 
declining rate in period two (y= –0.34) and a rate with the fastest increase out of all the 
female age groups (y= 0.72) in period three. 
 
The data in Tables 2 and 3 therefore point towards a strong cohort affect for men who 
were children or young adults during the worst years of the conflict. The affect is 
Age at first 
decade of 
conflict 
First 
decade 
1968-1978 
Second 
decade 
1978-1988 
Third  
decade 
1988-1998 
Fourth  
decade 
1998-2008 
Percentage  
change 
between first 
and second 
decade 
Percentage  
Change  
between 
second and 
fourth decade   
 Men 
Cohort 1 
aged <5   19.7 29.8 
  
Cohort 2 
aged 5-14  12.8 23.1 25 
 +95 
Cohort 3 
aged 15-24  6.8 15.9 17.6 23.3 
+134 +47 
Cohort 4 
aged 25-34 7.7 17.4 16.7 14.3 
+126 –17 
Cohort 5 
aged 35-44  11.4 17.1 18.9 11.6 
+50 –32 
Cohort 6 
aged 45-54  13.8 20.2 14.9 9.7 
+46 –52 
 Women 
Cohort 1 
aged <5   3.6 6.7 
  
Cohort 2 
aged 5-14  3.4 4 7.2 
 +111 
Cohort 3 
aged 15-24  2.8 6.3 7.7 8.7 
+125 +38 
Cohort 4 
aged 25-34 4.3 7.8 9.4 5.2 
+81 –33 
Cohort 5 
aged 35-44  7.8 11.4 6.3 4.1 
+46 –64 
Cohort 6 
aged 45-54  9.5 12.8 6 2.2 
+35 –83 
	observable for women, though it is weaker and complicated by differences in within-
decade trends.11  
 
Explaining Suicide Trends 
In summary, there are a number of changes in the social pattern of suicides that 
require explanation. What explains the rise in overall rates in period one, the decline in 
period two and the much steeper rise in period three which follows the 1998 
Agreement? Secondly, why has the gender gap in suicide rates grown and thirdly, why 
has the age profile of suicide rates changed, especially the trend towards younger age 
groups among men? Finally, what explains the consistent rise in suicide rates for the 
cohorts of men and women who were aged 5-24 during the first decade of conflict? 
The overarching question for this paper is what bearing does the conflict and the 
transition to peace have on any of these findings? 
 
In terms of how the conflict affected the trends in Figure 4, it is difficult to differentiate 
one development from another and to argue that they had distinct affects on the 
‘collective force… impelling men to self destruction’ (Durkheim, 2002: 263). More likely, 
a combination of factors are at play.  
 
Period one is characterised by a decline in IRA killings,12 and the adoption of new 
counter-insurgency measures. More than 5,000 people were being committed to prison 
each year – a figure that peaked at over 6,000 in 1987 – and hundreds were serving 
life sentences (Tomlinson, 1995: 201-7). Coulter (1991) provides a rare account of the 
impact on children and families, including suicide attempts of women. At the same 
time, the economy was faltering with unemployment rising steeply from under 6 per 
cent in the mid-1970s to over 21 per cent by 1984, approaching levels reached in the 
1930s. The social isolation of unemployment is an established risk factor for suicide 
(Lewis and Sloggett, 1998; Blakely et al., 2003), as are economic shocks and 
	insecurity (Stuckler et al., 2011). Yet the data above show declining suicide rates in two 
of the core working age groups for women. Part of the answer is that in the early 
1980s, female unemployment was less severe than for men and female employment 
recovered more quickly, continuing to expand until the 2008 recession (Department of 
Trade and Investment, 2010: 6). 
 
The overall decline in suicide rates in period two is mainly accounted for by the sharper 
decline in rates for older men and women than for the younger groups (Table 2). Two 
male age groups (15-24 and 25-34) show rising rates, against the trend for all other 
groups. It is difficult to relate these age affects to political circumstances. The conflict 
was essentially at stalemate during much of period two, punctuated by an upsurge in 
killings by non-state, pro-Union armed groups and growing evidence of collusion by 
elements within the state security forces (Cory Report, 2004). More plausibly, the 
increase in male suicides in the younger working age groups is associated with 
faltering employment prospects: economic inactivity for men shows a broad upward 
trend during the 1990s.  
 
The steep upward trend in suicide rates in the post-1998 period is not associated with 
unemployment as there was a sustained increase in employment for most of the period 
up to 2008 and a sense of economic prosperity not experienced for decades. This 
relatively rapid economic change is accompanied by profound political change 
following the gradual implementation of the 1998 Agreement. Rather than seeing this 
period as more anomic and less socially integrated than the decades of conflict, the 
transition to peace arguably involves greater social cohesion, political integration and 
stability. Political stability has rested on a broad-based embracing of equality as well as 
the specific commitment to peace by political and military actors (Campbell, 2008). For 
the wider population, everyday life which for decades had been framed by varying 
	degrees of fear, threat and polarised political life, became safer and more predictable.  
Open expressions of hatred, domination and violence became less socially acceptable.  
 
Regarding the widening gender gap in suicides, the long-term rise of the employment 
rate for women and the more checkered pattern for men provides part of the 
explanation, as indicated. It may also be that the conflict – as a result of imprisonment, 
migration and the individual and collective stresses of violence – exacerbated a 
number of trends contributing to social isolation. In period one, for example, the annual 
number of divorces increased three-fold; by the end of the 1990s they were up five-
fold. Men of working age are now twice as likely to be living alone than women, while 
the proportion of families headed by a lone mother increased from 10 to 23 per cent 
between 1983 and 1998.13 
 
The final issue concerns the cohort affect identified above. All age cohorts increased 
their suicide rates between the first and second decades of the conflict but by different 
factors (Table 3). From the second decade onwards, average suicide rates declined for 
most cohorts, except the youngest; and the older the cohort, the greater the decline –
suggesting age-related resilience. It seems reasonable to suggest that there was a 
population-wide conflict-related affect on the cohort of children and young people who 
were growing up in the first decade.  
 
There is a pathway linking political and social division to individual psychology. In the 
case of Northern Ireland, politics, employment, residential space, and social and 
cultural activities have all been shaped by division and violent conflict to such an extent 
that there have been two profound psychological impacts (Hamber, 2004). First, 
everyday life is highly politicised and all sides of the political divide have sanctioned 
violence in its various forms. Secondly, there is a ‘legacy of authoritarianism’ 
observable at the individual level, within communities and at the level of the state. 
	These effects will be strongest for those who grew up in the conflict and who 
experienced no other social context until the 1990s. In the period of peace, 
externalised expressions of the cultures of violence and authoritarianism have 
gradually subsided and to some extent violence has become internalised.  
 
The conflict-related stresses of everyday life were particularly acute among those who 
were in the frontline of the conflict. While there have been various claims regarding 
trauma and suicides, there are no systematic studies of combat troops, police officers 
and others.14 But there is survey evidence that those who experienced or witnessed the 
most violence have poorer mental health than those with the least experience (Miller et 
al., 2003; Muldoon et al., 2005) and are more likely to be economically disadvantaged 
(Hillyard et al., 2005).  
  
There are other symptoms and promoters of poor mental health. The transition to 
peace has involved mass medication with anti-depressants, alcohol and non-
prescription drugs. The volume of prescribed anti-depressants increased by six times 
between 1989 and 2000 (National Advisory Committee on Drugs, 2003). Alcohol 
consumption, particularly by men has risen dramatically since the 1990s, with more 
than a third of working age men under 45 drinking above safe limits. While this may be 
attributed to more relaxed licensing laws and post-1998 economic gains, it may also 
relate to the decline of traditionally strong pioneer and temperance movements (Smith 
and Foxcroft, 2009). In addition, there is the argument that drug use and the illicit drugs 
trade have flourished during the peace process (Higgins et al., 2004).  
 
Conclusion 
Few studies of war and suicide have tackled the sociological intricacies of divided 
societies characterised by sustained violent conflict, or have paid serious attention to 
the impact of peace on suicide trends. This case study of Northern Ireland examined 
	suicide trends by age, gender and cause of death over a forty-year period. The key 
finding is that the steep upward trend in suicide rates after the 1998 Agreement is 
associated with the conflict in a number of ways that take us beyond traditional 
Durkheimian ‘war and suicide’ sociology.  
 
The first point is that militarised conflicts and widespread political disturbances not only 
disrupt the compilation of suicide statistics but also shape the assumptions and 
decisions of key actors in the process of recording and adjudicating death. To neglect 
this point is to make spurious connections between short-term trends and conflict-
related events, including killings.  
 
Secondly, sustained conflicts have distinct effects on economic and social structures. 
In the case of Northern Ireland the conflict sharpened divisions in employment and 
unemployment, and, through specific experiences such as imprisonment, it increased 
social isolation at the level of families and households. Understanding the gendered 
experience of war and peace, therefore, is crucial to making sense of the male/female 
patterns of self-harming and completed suicide, and changing trends across the life 
cycle. 
 
Third, wars often involve extreme situations that produce suicides, such as in 1945 
Berlin, and they also produce short-term reactions to the pressures of military culture. 
What tends to be neglected is the long-term impact of violence on the broader social 
culture. It is not simply that the ‘long-term sequelae of war traumas have been 
underestimated’ (De Jong, 2002: 42). The main finding of the case study is that the 
cohort of children and young adults growing up in the worst years of violence now have 
the highest suicide rates and the most rapidly increasing rates. These generations 
were the most acculturated to division and conflict, and to externalised expressions of 
aggression. The consequence of peace is that such expressions of aggression and 
	violence are no longer socially approved. They become internalised instead. 
 
Finally, we need to distinguish between the social changes that wars bring about and 
contribute to, and the direct effects of war on the mental health and behaviour of 
individual witnesses, survivors and perpetrators of violence. Durkheim’s social 
integration theory continues to influence the analysis of suicide but sits uneasily 
alongside the complexities of contemporary wars and within country violent conflicts. In 
the quest to establish and privilege sociological over psychological explanations, a 
Durkheimian approach goes against what is most needed in research on war, peace 
and suicide: multidisciplinary insights that move us beyond the polarity of sociology and 
psychology, and illuminate the psychosocial pathways that link social structure and 
process to individual meaning and action. 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
																																																								
1.   The Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) was popularly endorsed by 
referendums held in the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland which had been governed 
directly by Britain since 1972. 
2.   Egoistic suicide arises from an excess of individualism, less likely in conditions of war. 
Anomic suicide stems from a lack of social regulation typically arising from a period of rapid 
change, especially economic change, during which established norms and values become 
less relevant and powerful at both social and individual levels (see Baudelot and Establet, 
2008).  
3.  Bills and Li (2005) examined the association between homicide and suicide for 65 
countries, finding a weak statistical relationship overall.  
 
																																																																																																																																																																			
4.  Goeschel attributes the increase in suicides to the waves of deportations of German Jews, 
hardships caused by the Allied bombing of towns from 1942 (destroying the housing of a 
third of the population), demoralisation following the defeat at Stalingrad, and Nazi terror 
against foreigners.    
5.  For two recent exceptions by historians, see Padiak (2009) and Prestwich (2009). 
6.  The rate for 1967 is the average of 1965, 1966 and 1967 rates. The figures include ‘events 
of undetermined intent’ as it is now conventional to count these as ‘suicides’. 
7.  Doctors must refer such deaths to coroners who may decide to hold an inquest, a 
mandatory requirement in the case of suspected suicides until very recently. 
8.  This method was used by Sainsbury and Jenkins (1982) to assess the impact of the 
introduction of the ‘undetermined intent’ classification. 
9.  Table 3 (unlike Table 2) includes suicide rates for the first decade of the conflict as these 
are averaged out over an eleven-year period.  
10.  The Pearson correlation between men and women for percentage change between the 
second and fourth decades (last column) is highly significant (r[2]= 1.00, p <.01).  
11. The distinction between cohort, age and period effects is discussed by Gunnell et al. 
(2003).  
12.  IRA killings fell from 93 in 1979 to 37 by 1986. 
13.  Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (various years) Continuous Household 
Survey. http://www.csu.nisra.gov.uk 
14.  The Police Federation claims that ‘almost 70 officers have committed suicide, many of 
them with RUC-issued weapons’ (http://www.royalulsterconstabulary.org/memorial.htm). 
Suicides among UK regular armed forces are analysed annually by the Defence Analytical 
Services Agency but no attempt is made to disaggregate specific theatres of conflict or 
combat experience (see Tomlinson, 2006: 102-3). Recent studies of ex-prisoners have 
drawn attention to poor mental health, linking it to experience of police interrogation and 
prison itself. (Grounds and Jamieson, 2003; Hamber, 2005; Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008)  
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